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We studied nonpharmaceutical interventions used to
mitigate the second, and most deadly, wave of the
1918–1920 influenza pandemic in the United States. We
conclude that several small communities implemented
potentially successful attempts at preventing the introduc-
tion of influenza.
T
he 1918–1920 influenza pandemic was the deadliest
pandemic in human history (1–6). We undertook a his-
torical evaluation of nonpharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) during that pandemic (7), with an emphasis on
American communities during the second wave
(September–December 1918). The full report and a digital
archive of primary sources for this study can be accessed
online (available from http://www.med.umich.edu/
medschool/chm/influenza).
The Study
We selected 6 US communities that reported relatively
few, if any, cases of influenza and no more than 1 influen-
za-related death while NPIs were enforced during the sec-
ond wave of the 1918 pandemic: San Francisco Naval
Training Station, Yerba Buena Island, California;
Gunnison, Colorado; Princeton University, Princeton, New
Jersey; Western Pennsylvania Institution for the Blind,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Trudeau Tuberculosis
Sanatorium, Saranac Lake, New York; and Fletcher,
Vermont (Table). We also studied the college community
of Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, which
took several intensive NPI measures and experienced no
deaths during the second wave but did encounter a high
case rate (25% of its student body). We identified these
sites first by consulting Jordan’s 1927 text, Epidemic
Influenza (1). We then verified and modified this list by
reviewing 240 federal, 92 state (from 40 states), and 25
special local reports and documents. We conducted in situ
archival research at 34 locations and examined >1,400
newspaper and contemporary medical and scientific jour-
nal articles for the 1918–1920 period.
The communities we identified were diverse and had
unique characteristics. Fletcher, Vermont (population 737),
was simply too small to suggest that its success resulted
from anything more than remote location, good fortune, or
the ways in which the virus skipped some communities
altogether for unknown reasons (8–10). The Trudeau
Tuberculosis Sanitarium (9) and the Western Pennsylvania
Institution for the Blind (10) were already de facto quaran-
tine islands because of the era’s prevailing views toward
confinement of the contagious and the disabled. Princeton
University provided a good example of how a social insti-
tution with some measure of control over its population
might implement NPIs to protect itself (11).
The US Naval Base at Yerba Buena Island in San
Francisco Bay (12) and the mining town of Gunnison,
Colorado (13), also offer potential lessons for contempo-
rary pandemic influenza preparedness planning. Under
the direction of public health officers, the still-healthy
island and mountain town essentially cut off all contact
with the outside world to shield themselves from the
incursion of influenza. The 2 sites saw almost no cases of
infection and thus experienced no deaths, for 2 and 4
months, respectively.
Most important, these communities enacted a policy we
have termed protective sequestration, or the measures
taken by the authorities to protect a defined and still-
healthy population from infection before it reaches that
population. These measures include the following: 1) pro-
hibitions on members of the community from leaving the
site; 2) prohibitions against visitors from entering a cir-
cumscribed perimeter; 3) typically placing in quarantine
those visitors who are allowed to enter for a period of time
before admission; and 4) if available, taking advantage of
geographic barriers, such as an island or remote location.
Several themes emerged from our historical research.
First, coordination among public agencies is essential to
any effective public health response. Despite some tension
among city, county, and state officials in Gunnison, their
relatively smooth cooperation may have played a role in
their implementing and maintaining strict public health
measures. Second, neither Gunnison nor Yerba Buena
could have escaped the flu without full cooperation from
the local population. Gunnison’s low population density
and self-sufficient ranching lifestyle made it easier for res-
idents to bide their time (Figure 1). At Yerba Buena, the
military chain of command mandated the cooperation of
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base from the outside world with little interference
(Figure 2). Finally, these communities had the advantage
of early warnings to prepare their populations. Both
tracked influenza’s westward movement from August to
September and, unlike communities along the East Coast,
could implement protective health strategies before cases
appeared at their doorsteps.
One would like to think that the 6 communities we iden-
tified fared better than others because of the NPIs they
enacted. While we cannot prove this for any of them, the
case is perhaps strongest for Yerba Buena and possibly
Gunnison. Further complicating our task, in addition to the
uneven quality and quantity of information available for
study, is that some of these communities were sparsely pop-
ulated and geographically isolated, and all of them were
subject to the vagaries of how the influenza virus affected
populations. Indeed, these communities represent the
exception rather than the rule in terms of how most
American communities experienced the influenza pandem-
ic of 1918–1920 (14,15). This leads to several intriguing
questions regarding what these escape communities can
teach us about pandemic preparations today, let alone the
question of whether such measures can even be replicated.
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First, protective sequestration, if enacted early enough
in the pandemic, crafted so as to encourage the compliance
of the population involved, and continued for the lengthy
time period in which the area is at risk, stands the best
chance of guarding against infection. Second, available
data from the second wave of the 1918–1920 influenza
pandemic fail to show that any other NPI (apart from pro-
tective sequestration) was, or was not, effective in prevent-
ing the spread of the virus. Despite implementing several
NPIs, most communities sustained considerable illness and
death. We could not assess how the timing of NPI imple-
mentation across the nation affected disease mitigation
efforts nor whether these NPIs lessened what might have
been even higher rates had these measures not been in
place in various locations. Moreover, we could not locate
any consistent, reliable data supporting the conclusion that
face masks, as available and as worn during the
1918–1920 influenza pandemic, conferred any protection
to the populations that wore them (16). In fact, evidence
suggests that in most American communities NPIs did not
prevent the spread of virus in 1918. What remains unclear
is the extent to which they may have been partially effec-
tive in reducing spread or mitigating community impact.
However inconclusive the data from 1918 are, the col-
lective experiences of American communities from the
pandemic are noteworthy, especially in light of the fact
that, if faced with a pandemic today, we would likely rely
on many of these same NPIs to attempt to mitigate the
spread of the infection until pharmacological supplies of
vaccine and antiviral agents were available (17–19). It is
true that the United States of today is a much different
nation than it was in 1918, with a larger, more mobile, and
more complex society. It is equally true that the communi-
ties we examined were all small and relatively isolated (or
isolatable). Nevertheless, in the event of another influenza
pandemic, many specific subcommunities (e.g., military
installations, college and university campuses, nursing
homes) may wish to consider protective sequestration
measures as potential means to prevent or delay the onset
of epidemic influenza in their populations.
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